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Abstract. A secure human identification protocol aims at authenticat-
ing human users to a remote server when even the users’ inputs are not
hidden from an adversary. Recently, the authors proposed a human iden-
tification protocol in the RSA Conference 2007, which is loosely based
on the ability of humans to efficiently process an image. The advantage
being that an automated adversary is not effective in attacking the pro-
tocol without human assistance. This paper extends that work by trying
to solve some of the open problems. First, we analyze the complexity of
defeating the proposed protocols by quantifying the workload of a hu-
man adversary. Secondly, we propose a new construction based on textual
CAPTCHAs (Reverse Turing Tests) in order to make the generation of
automated challenges easier. We also present a brief experiment involv-
ing real human users to find out the number of possible attributes in a
given image and give some guidelines for the selection of challenge ques-
tions based on the results. Finally, we analyze the previously proposed
protocol in detail for the relationship between the secrets. Our results
show that we can construct human identification protocols based on im-
age evaluation with reasonably “quantified” security guarantees based
on our model.
1 Introduction
Suppose a student wishes to write a confidential email to disclose the information
of a leaked out exam paper to his friend. Using a secure email client the student
writes down an email, sends it and logs out. The email shall be encrypted and
would only be viewable by the recipient once he logs in to check the email. How
can the student be sure that the email was sent securely and no one could learn
anything apart from the intended recipient? The answer relies on the weakest
security link: the password. Little did the student know that his computer was
being key-logged [18]. There was a hidden camera looking at the student’s every
move. His fellow student also shoulder surfed on the password. Even if no one
saw the mail being written, they could log on later to view the sent mail box.
It turns out that no matter how secure the email client was, it only served its
purpose until the password was not compromised.
Similar situation occurs when one inputs PIN numbers on ATMs. We could
use biometrics instead of passwords or pin numbers. But biometric data is only
secure unless the biometric information is kept confidential and the equipment
has not been tampered. So, are these mechanisms unsecure or useless? They
certainly aren’t. They were designed with certain assumptions in mind: The
passwords selected by the user should be truly random strings of a suitable
length; the pin numbers selected by the user should be truly random 4-digit
numbers; the user has the responsibility to hide her input from peeping eyes. It
has been an interesting topic of research in cryptography to devise authentication
protocols that meet the security reequirements even when the above mentioned
assumptions do not hold. This highly vulnerable security environment has been
termed as the “naked human in a glass house” model in [16], although the
first protocol constructed to be secure in this model was by Matsumoto [2]. We
shall call such protocols as “Human Identification Protocols” or HIPs in short
following the terminology in literature. A lot of human identification protocols
have been proposed in literature with the goal of ease of “human execution” in
mind. The protocols should take roughly the same amount of time as a password
based protocol takes. Researchers have tried to construct protocols that are
secure and require little or no computation on the human’s part. This indeed is
a very hard goal to achieve and reflects through the fact that there are not a lot
of proposed human identification protocols over the years.
The situation, however, is not as bad as it seems. Humans possess good
cognitive abilities. We can recall a previously viewed image with a very high
probability when presented to us again. We do not need to memorise all the
details of the picture. This has led to the use of graphics as essential ingredients
of human identification protocols. Proposed identification protocols can be im-
plemented with a graphical implementation. For example, instead of memorizing
the string 00101, we can display five pictures, each time, where the third and the
fifth picture is shown to the user apriori as the user’s secret pictures. We could
go a step further and use the things that an image describes to build human
identification protocols. In [1] we proposed that instead of using pictures just
as memory aids, we can use their internal structure in some way to construct
a human identification protocol. The secret could be one of the concepts that
the picture satisfies. It was conjectured that it would be hard even for a human
adversary to find the secret. However, no exact quantification of this hardness
was given. While the hardness of breaking the protocol is clearly evident against
automated adversaries (computer programs programmed to defeat the protocol),
the security against “human adversaries” needs more attention. This study aims
to enhance the work proposed in [1] by answering some of the open problems
and moves a step further in trying to quantify the hardness of the underlying
problem. We address the following issues:
– We present a new protocol with the aim of generating automated instances
of challenges. This construction is loosely based on the Gimpy CAPTCHAs
[17] and requires the server to only maintain a dictionary of words.
– We analyze the security of the protocol presented in [1] and the ones pre-
sented in this paper with a new perspective. We show how much work has
to be performed by a “human” adversary in order to obtain the secret based
on our model.
– We show the interrelationship of the two “secrets” of the protocol presented
in [1].
– We also present another way of viewing the underlying problem of these
protocols using matrix representation. This view helps to understand the
principal hardness of the protocols presented.
– Finally, we show the results of some experiments which show the amount of
information in a very simple image. This data leads us to some guidelines
while selecting the secret which we have also mentioned.
Our study will deal with passive adversaries only. The reason being that if we
deal with active adversaries in the protocols, then we might require the human
user to send some random challenges to the remote server in order to authenti-
cate it as well. This generation of random challenges requires an extra amount
of computation from the human user’s part, and might deem the protocols im-
practical. This is left as a future work.
2 Related Work
The first work on human identification dates back to [2]. Since then a lot of other
schemes have been proposed in literature [4],[5],[6],[7],[9],[14]. Some of them were
broken in [4], [15]. While most of them involve some numerical calculations like [2]
and the HB protocol[7], they can be implemented using some graphical interface
employing pictures as memory aids. We can categorized the human identifica-
tion protocols into two broad categories: Protocols built to be secure against
general eavesdropping adversaries and protocols secure against only “guessing
adversaries” i.e. Adversaries who do not see the user’s input and hence try to
guess the secret or impersonate the user without any apriori knowledge. Proto-
cols mentioned so far fall in the first category. They have a drawback, however,
that they involve extra computation from the user. As an example, in the HB
protocol [7], the user is required to compute bit-wise binary multiplication for
some number of bits in every iteration. This may not seem much but to obtain
a higher level of security, the number of computations increase significantly.
In the second category, the most well known example is the traditional pass-
word based authentication system. Others include purely graphical schemes like
DeJa Vu[10],Passface [11], Point & Click [12] and [3] that require little or no nu-
merical computation whatsoever. The basic theme of [10] and [11] is to present
the user a series of pictures, a subset of which are the secret pictures. The user
is authenticated if its selection of the secret pictures among the given set of pic-
tures is correct. On the other hand, in [12] the user is authenticated if it clicks
on the correct secret location in the given picture. [3] works similarly by letting
the user draw the secret symbol or figure on a display device. Evidently, these
purely graphical schemes are not secure against “peeping” attacks [9]. Anyone
observing the actions of the user can find out the secret in no time. For a detailed
account of all the schemes, see [9]. In our previous work [1], we proposed to use
internal properties of images as secrets. After a secret has been chosen, pictures
which satisfy the properties were presented randomly with the pictures that do
not satisfy the property. The user has to answer the pictures according to the
secret property. It was conjectured that finding out the secret property is a hard
problem for adversaries. For automated adversaries, this follows immediately
from the definition of CAPTCHAs[8]. But for human adversaries, this hardness
is difficult to prove. In this paper, we have tried to quantify this hardness and
tried to answer some of the open questions described above.
3 The Main Idea
Consider the picture of a magic square shown in Figure 1. How many things
does the picture represent? A simple glance at it can reveal a lot of things: a
magic square, a square, nine small squares, digits, black, white, the digit 4, the
digit 2, line(s), the right angle etc. It is amazing how much information does a
rather simple looking picture contain. We call each piece of this information as
a feature. We can take one of these features and construct a question out of it.
For example: Does the picture contain a rectangle?. This question is shared as
a secret between the server and the user. After that, a series of pictures can be
presented to the user such that with probability 1/2 they satisfy the question
and with probability 1/2 they don’t. The user has to scan the picture and answer
‘yes’ or ‘no’ accordingly. How about the adversary? The adversary would like to
know the secret feature. The best way to do it is to extract all features in the
pictures presented to the user and then do intersection (if user’s answer is ‘yes’)
or difference (if user’s answer is ‘no’) to narrow down the number of possible
secret features.
From an abstract point of view, we may define a universal set of all features,
all pictures could possibly have. Denote this set as S = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n is
the total number of features. Any subset of this set represents a picture. Given
a subset A of this set (which again is a picture) and its corresponding response
bit a from the user, we would be interested in finding out how the adversary can
find the hidden feature and hence the secret question. Obviously, it is almost
impossible to write a computer program which given a picture can filter out
all the features that picture describes considering the enormous size of the set
of all features. This immediately implies the need of human intervention. So,
what could be the best strategy to find out the hidden feature? One way is
to have a cursory glance at the pictures and see if there is something common
between the pictures. A more efficient way is to find out all the features in the
pictures, and then check which features are common between the pictures. But
once the features have been extracted, one could make a program that would
Fig. 1. A simple picture of a magic square may describe a lot of things
automatically filter out the common features. Thus we will only be concerned
with the workload on the human adversary which amounts to finding out all the
features in the pictures until a single common feature is found. Our analysis will
try to quantify the complexity of our proposed schemes based on the workload
on human adversary using the mentioned approach. Namely, given a picture A
and its corresponding answer bit a the adversary has to flag all the features as
the candidate secret features if a = 1 or else delete all the features present in
this picture from the candidate set of features if a = 0. Thus the adversary’s job
is to find out the features by personally checking every picture and narrow down
the set of candidate secret features.
We will now present protocols based on this main idea in the next section. Each
protocol follows a short discussion and a brief account of the workload on the
adversary. The detailed analysis follows in Section VI and VII.
4 Identification Schemes
Before we present the proposed schemes we present the general notation which
will be used throughout this manuscript. We assume there to be a pool of dis-
tinct pictures P , each element of which is denoted by P , and a set of questions
Q. Each question q has a binary answer when applied to any picture in P . Each
question therefore asks whether a certain feature is present in the picture or
not. We will also use q to represent the function: q : P → {0, 1}, which repre-
sents the evaluation of a picture according to the question. The user’s answer
string is represented by A, where A (i) represents the ith bit in the string. We
will use a to denote an arbitrary answer bit. From now onwards, the word “ad-
versary” or the symbol H would mean the “human” eavesdropping adversary,
unless otherwise specified. The workload of H for each protocol will be based
on the complexity of the above mentioned algorithm (or a slight variant of it)
which is described in Section VI. Due to a bulk of notation used in this arti-
cle, we will abuse this general notation in some sections or subsections without
compromising disambiguity.
4.1 The Basic Scheme
We have the following immediate basic scheme:
Setup. The user and the server share a secret question q from Q.
Protocol.
– Repeat k times
• The server picks a bit b uniformly at random, and picks a picture P from
P such that q (P ) = b. Discards this picture from the pool, and presents
it to the user.
• The user submits a = q (P ).
– Output accept if all answer’s are correct, otherwise output reject
The scheme is described pictorically in Figure 2, where 2 pictures are shown
at each iteration. We could present all k pictures at the same time depending
Fig. 2. The Basic Protocol with L = 2 and secret question q =“Does the picture
contain a basketball?”
on whether they can be displayed on the screen or not. In anycase we can find a
number L such that we can have ⌈k/L⌉ iterations in one authentication session.
According to the analysis in Section VI, the number of pictures the adversary
has to observe to obtain the secret feature would be: log2 n regardless of the
value of L. This amounts to a total work of n2 log2 n, which has to be done by
the human adversary. Setting in the values n = 106, we get a total work of ≈ 223
units.
Discussion on the protocol This protocol is simple and practical. However, there
is a big disadvantage. Namely, the user is sending its answers in the clear. An
adversary thus knows the “correct” answer to all the pictures shown to the user.
This makes the life of the adversary a bit easier since it can have a glance at
the pictures to find out the common secret feature. We would like to somehow
“hide” the answer sequence, thus making it hard for the adversary to guess the
secret feature. The next protocol attempts to do that. This protocol was the
original protocol presented in [1].
Matrix Interpretation Consider the set of all features S = {1, 2, . . . , n} as de-
scribed in the previous section. Each picture contains a subset of this universal
set of features. The secret question can also be considered as a subset of this set
with a single element. We can represent the features of a presented picture i as
a vector vi with all the features not present in the picture represented by 0’s,
and the secret question as x with only one entry equal to 1. We can then write
the answer bit as vi ·x = a. Thus if we have more pictures, we can represent the
protocol as the matrix operation:Vx = a, where V is the matrix containing row
vectors vi representing the features of the picture i, and a is the answer vector.
The obvious way to solve this requires O (n) pictures and corresponding answers.
However, as we will see in Section VI, not all pictures will contain features from
the full feature space. Therefore, the actual number of picture and answer pairs
required would be less than that. The real difficulty of the problem, however, is
to find out the features in the pictures and thus construct the correct matrix V.
Our matrix representation shows one way of describing the problem needed to
be solved by H.
4.2 The Enhanced Protocol
Suppose we want to present L pictures at a time to the user. The pictures are
labeled from 1 to L in sequential order. The idea is to permute the numbers
randomly. Out of the resulting permutation, select l numbers, and label the
others as “don’t care positions”. This permutation string is also shared as a secret
between the user and the server. Each time a series of L pictures are presented.
The user answer’s the pictures according to the order in the permutation string,
and fills the “don’t care positions” with random bits. So, for example, if L = 10
and l = 5, then a possible permutation string would be ∗ ∗ 54 ∗ 39 ∗ ∗0, where
the “∗” represents a don’t care position. We label such a permutation string
as σ. We now have two secrets in our scheme: the secret question q and the
permutation string σ. The user thus has to answer a series of pictures according
to the function: qσ : P → {0, 1}. The user is accepted if the answers are correct
at the l positions in each of the k iterations. The rest of the protocol is the same
as the basic protocol.
The protocol is described in Figure 3. Here we have taken L = 5, l = 3 and
k = 1. The permutation string is 2∗43∗ and the secret question is “Is the picture
somehow related to computation?”.
Fig. 3. The Enhanced Protocol with L = 5, l = 3 and k = 1 and secret question q =“Is
the picture somehow related to computation?”
In Section VI, we show that the total amount of work required by the ad-
versary is: L
2+1
l+1
n
2 log2 n. Putting in the values L = 10, l = 5 and n = 10
6, we
get a total work load of ≈ 227. Which is significantly higher than the previous
protocol. The adversary thus gets the secret question. But how about the secret
permutation string σ? The adversary is only successful in impersonating as the
legitimate user if it knows σ. It turns out that after the secret question has been
revealed, it just takes a handful of iterations to observe to guess the permutation
string with high probability. We show this in Section V.
Discussion on the protocol Even though this protocol does have an advantage
over the basic protocol in the sense that the correct answer sequence is shuffled,
it seems hard to construct a method so as to hide the answer sequence completely
with not too much effort on the user’s part. It not only adds extra burden while
answering the pictures, it also slows down the process. Secondly, in the two
schemes proposed, there is a big question of practicality. How to automatically
generate those pictures? We conjecture that it is hard to write a program that
can extract all the features from the given features. But how about the problem
of generating or finding out images satisfying a given question automatically?
This might not be possible for all questions. In the next scheme we try to create
a protocol that can automatically generate instances.
Matrix Interpretation It would be interesting to know whether this protocol
can be presented in a matrix representation. We could represent it as Vx = a.
However, the actual answer sequence is not the same as a in this case. Thus we
can represent it as: Vx = pL (a) where pL (a) is a permutation operation on a
taking its L components at a time. However, we still have the case that some
of the bits in a are random. This becomes a problem similar to the Learning
Parity with Noise (LPN) problem presented in the HB protocol [7]. Again, the
real problem in our scheme is to extract all features from the pictures and thus
constructing a correct matrix V.
4.3 A Practical Scheme
In this scheme, we would use the Gimpy CAPTCHA [17]. Gimpy works by
picking several words from a dictuonary, distorting the text of these words and
presenting the resulting words in the form of an image in front of a human user.
The idea is that the current computer programs cannot comprehend the text. We
assume a dictionary of size N . The algorithm Gimpy (j) does the same thing as
gimpy, except that now it takes a desired number j, of words from the dictionary.
Let L be a small positive number, e.g. 11. The whole image screen is divided into
L boxes. Let s and t be non-negative integers modulo L, kept as secret between
the user and the computer. An initial value x0, another non-negative number
modulo L, is also kept as a secret. A secret question q is constructed from the
dictionary words. For example, q could be: “Are there more than three words
begining with the letter “B”?”. Let Gimpy (q, j) be the algorithm that takes j
pictures from the dictionary such that the resulting challenge satisfies the ques-
tion q, and let Gimpy (−q, j) be the one that does not satisfy q. Let Grid (L) be
the procedure that concatenates L images (boxes) into one image in the form of
a grid. The protocol is described as follows:
Setup. Randomly generate integers s, t and x0 modulo a public integer L, and
share them as a secret between the server and the user. Share a secret question
q from Q.
Protocol.
– For i = 1 to k, do:
• Compute xi ≡ sxi−1 + t mod L.
• Select a bit b uniformly at random and apply Gimpy (q, j) to the xith
box if b = 1 and Gimpy (−q, j) otherwise.
• For each of the remaining boxes, apply Gimpy (j).
• Apply Grid (L), and present it as a challenge to the user.
• The user computes xi ≡ sxi−1 + t mod L and submits a = q (xi), where
xi denotes the xith box.
– Output accept if all answer’s are correct, otherwise output reject.
The protocol is described in the Figure 4. Here L = 4, s = 3, t = 3, x0 = 5.
Thus x1 = 2 and so the user looks at the picture labelled 2 and answers the
question q =“Does the picture contain the names of at least two animals?”. The
pictures are taken from the Gimpy webpage [17] How about the total amount
Fig. 4. The Protocol Scheme with L = 4, s = 3, t = 3, x0 = 5 and secret question
q =“Does the picture contain the names of at least two animals?”
of required by the adversary? We see that this protocol has the form of the
previous protocol if we let L = L and l = 1. Thus the total amount of work
required by the adversary isL
2+1
2
n(N)
2 log2 (n (N)). The quantity n (N) denotes
that the total number of features (possible questions) are a function of the size
N of the dictionary.
Discussion on the protocol The main theme of the protocol is to let the human
adversary write down all the words presented in the image. Notice the use of the
linear congruential generator xi ≡ sxi−1 + t mod L, for small values of L and
hence s and t. This is used to induce randomness in the selection of the secret box.
Although this is not a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator,
and certainly not for small values of L, the use is just there to inject some kind of
randomness. Since the values of xi are not shown in the clear, it is safe enough for
our purposes. Notice that for some values of the parameters s, t and x0, the xi’s
do not span the whole set of integers modulo L. This again is not a worry as the
adversary does not know which parameters are chosen. But the most important
concern is: How much do the distorted images of texts and numbers describe?
Unfortunately, the full spectrum of features described by a distorted image of
a word from a dictionary is not much more than a natural image. Therefore,
we should conclude that although the above scheme puts some autonomy in the
challenge generation process, it is not as secure as the ones which contain natural
images in terms of the workload on the adversary. Details follow in Section VI.
Matrix Interpretation Once again, we are tempted to use a matrix representation
for the protocol. We could represent it as p (V)x = a, where V represents the
matrix of features of all the L pictures in every iteration. And p (V) represents
the function which picks one of those L pictures according to chosen parameters
of the linear congruential generator. Thus this protocol is opposite of the previous
one in the sense that instead of diffusing the answer string, the pictures are sort
of randomly chosen each time.
4.4 Using Multiple Questions
In [1] we proposed that we can have a group of questions as a secret connected
by any combination of logical connectives, like AND, OR and NOT. However, we
should not have greater than a certain number of logically connected features,
because otherwise the workload on the legitimate user increases considerably.
We could safely use a group of 3 or less questions. The adversary’s algorithm
described above and in the analysis will not work in this case, unless all the
questions are connected by the logical AND. There are still ways to go around
this, the adversary this time around looks for inconsistent features in the pic-
ture and eliminates them in each iteration. More precisely, the adversary’s task
is to find a boolean function consisting of 3 or less literals that satisfies the
truth assignments of all the literals. More precisely, let V denote the matrix
consisting of features extracted from the pictures. Each column of this matrix
represents the absence or presence of a feature in the corresponding picture. If
the adversary also knows the answer vector a, then its job is to find a boolean
function satisfying the mapping. We could use multiple questions in any three of
the above protocols. The basic protocol is then reduced trivially to the problem
of finding the boolean function defined above. The enhanced protocol however
becomes a bit more tricky, since we do not know the exact evaluation of the ex-
pression. The practical scheme also becomes hard as we do not know the literals
being used in the evaluation of the boolean function. There can be two variants
of this protocol; The basic protocol and the enhanced protocol. Obviously, the
adversary can eliminate inconsistent features in the basic protocol easily as it
does not involve any random replies. However, if we use the enhanced protocol
with questions connected by logical operators, we can make the adversary’s task
harder as there would be random bits in the answer sequence as well.
5 Experiments
We did a few experiments in order to get an idea about the efficiency of our
scheme. The experimental stage consisted of two main experiments: The first
one was carried out to see how many distinct features can be extracted from
a given picture; The second one was to check whether it is easy for a human
user to tell whether a given feature is present in a picture or not. For the first
experiment, we presented the image in Figure 1 to ten participants (all computer
science graduate school students). Each one of them were asked to write down as
many features as they believed the picture contained. A commulative total of 42
distinct features were extracted by the participants altogether, not counting the
multiplicity of some features (such as the digits 1,2,...,9 are written together).
These features are given in the Table 1 along with their frequency which means
the number of participants who wrote down the corresponding feature:
Table 1. Experimental Results
Feature Freq & Res Feature Freq & Res
Numbers (Digits 1-9) 5 ✔✔✔ Digits without closed loop(s) 1 ✔✔✔
Black color 4 ✔✔✔ Digits with closed loop(s) 1 ✔✔✔
Columns and rows sum to 15 3 ✔✔✔ A heart 1 ✔✘✔
Diagonal sums to 15 3 ✔✔✔ Sign board 1 ✔✘✘
Square(s) 3 ✔✔✔ Triangle 1 ✔✘✔
Matrix 3 ✔✔✔ Cross(es) 1 ✔✘✔
3X3 matrix 3 ✔✔✔ Line(s) 1 ✔✔✔
White color 2 ✔✔✔ Rectangle(s) 1 ✔✔✘
Magic square 2 ✔✔✔ Stair(s) 1 ✔✔✔
Odd number(s) 2 ✔✔✔ ’+’sign 1 ✔✔✔
Black line(s) 2 ✔✔✔ Circle(s) 1 ✔✔✔
Hook 1 ✔✘✔ Zig zag path 1 ✔✘✔
Slide 1 ✔✘✔ Alphabets C,S,L and O 1 ✔✘✔
’X’ sign 1 ✔✘✘ The string 492357816 1 ✔✔✔
The string 438951276 1 ✔✔✔ Distortion in slanted line(s) 1 ✔✘✔
Table 1 ✔✘✔ Array 1 ✔✔✔
Balance 1 ✘✘✘ Equilibrium 1 ✔✘✘
Symmetry 1 ✔✔✔ Complements 1 ✔✔✘
Typed digit(s) 1 ✔✔✔ White area > Black area 1 ✔✔✔
Even number(s) 1 ✔✔✔ The right angle 1 ✔✔✔
Mathematics 1 ✔✔✘ Arithmetic 1 ✔✔✘
Once the features were collected, they were shown to three separate individ-
uals not present in the first experiment. They were shown the picture and asked
to answer whether the given list of features found by the participants in the first
experiment were present in the picture or not. Their responses are shown in the
column labeled ”Freq and Res” where a ✔represents that the corresponding par-
ticipant believed the feature to be present in the picture. Not surprisingly, the
features with the higher frequencies were answered correctly by all three users.
On the other hand, some of the single frequency features were also answered
correctly by all three users. The ones with indifferent answers are those that
require a ‘keen’ eye, e.g. “hook”. These experiments show that even a simple
picture as the one shown in Figure 1 can have a lot of features, majority of
which are very easy to answer but not so easy to extract. There can still be a lot
more features present in the picture; one such example is ”‘one side of a rubik’s
cube”’. This survey gives us some guidelines while choosing the pictures and/or
secret questions:
– Do not use pictures whose main object is the secret feature. So for example,
if we chose the picture of Figure 1 as the challenge picture, then the secret
question of ”‘Does the picture contain the digits 1-9?”’ will certainly be a
bad choice.
– Do not use simple pictures. Simple pictures contain very few features. This
is evident from Figure 1. Although, one may still be able to think of more
features, there does not seem to be a big number of features.
– Do not use secret questions which are hard to answer by the legitimate user.
As an example, the feature ”‘Equilibrium”’ in the above table was answered
”‘no”’ by two users. This seems hard to find out in the picture and needs
more of a philosophical eye.
– Always allow for user error. So for example, if the user replies ’10’ pictures,
allow an error of 2 to 3 wrong answers. This is clear from the picture that a
user answered ”‘no”’ to the feature ”‘Mathematics”’, even though it seems
to be describe the figure.
6 Analysis of the Enhanced Protocol
In this section, we would like to analyze the relationship between the hidden
permutation σ and the secret question q in the enhanced protocol. The purpose
of analysis is to find out the strength of the protocol if one of these secrets is
leaked out. For the first part, let’s assume that the adversary somehow found out
the hidden permutation σ but not the secret question. Since the adversary knows
the hidden permutation, it knows exactly which questions are being answered
and which one are being answered randomly. Thus the adversary can neglect
the randomly answered pictures and use the pictures with correct answers to
look for the secret question. Thus this transforms to the Basic Protocol in a
straightforward manner.
For the other side, let us assume the adversary H who knows the secret
question q. It evaluates each picture for upto k iterations. Let Xi (t) be the
variable representing the evaluated bit of the ith picture in the tth iteration
of the enhanced protocol, where 1 ≤ t ≤ k. H thus evaluates the following
information after k iterations:
X1 (t) X2 (t) · · · XL (t)
b11 b12 · · · b1L
b21 b22 · · · b2L
...
...
...
...
bk1 bk2 · · · bkL
where each bij is the bit evaluated by H for the corresponding picture. H also
has the following response table from the legitimate user:
Y1 (t) Y2 (t) · · · YL (t)
a11 a12 · · · a1L
a21 a22 · · · a2L
...
...
...
...
ak1 ak2 · · · akL
where each Yi (t) represents the user’s response bit to the ith picture in the tth
iteration. The adversary now runs the following simple algorithm:
– Initialize σ (.) = null.
– For each Xi (t), check whether there exists a Yj (t) such that the two match
at every corresponding bit position.
• If there is only one such Yj (t) then mark σ (j) = i.
• If there are two such Yj (t)’s then halt.
– Assign * to each unassigned position of σ (.)
– Output the permutation σ and halt.
We now state the following theorem:
Theorem 1((
1−
1
2k
)L−1(
l
L
)
+
(
1−
1
2k
)L (
1−
l
L
))L
≤ Pr [σ is correct] ≤
(
1−
1
2k
(
1−
l
L
))L
Proof. Let Ai be the event that the adversary correctly guesses the ith position
of the permutation σ. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary
starts with the left most position and goes on to the next position in sequential
order. We have to find the probability:
Pr [σ is correct] = Pr [A1] Pr [A2|A1] · · ·Pr [AL|A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1]
Now let Bi be the event that position i is not the don’t care position. Let Bi be
the complementary event. It is clear that:
Pr [Ai] = Pr [Ai|Bi] Pr [Bi] + Pr
[
Ai|Bi
]
Pr
[
Bi
]
Fig. 5. Guessing Probability
It is easy to see that:
Pr [B1] =
l
L
and Pr
[
B1
]
= 1−
l
L
If B1 is true then X1 (t) matches at least one of the Yj (t)’s . The adversary’s
algorithm will guess it correctly if there is only one such Yj (t). So:
Pr [A1|B1] = Pr [There exists only one j such thatYj (t) = X1 (t)]
= 1×
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
× . . .×
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L−1 times
=
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)L−1
Now if B1 is true, then the algorithm will detect this if X1 (t) does not match
any of the Yj (t)’s. The probability of this being true is:
Pr
[
A1|B1
]
=
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
· · ·
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L times
=
(
1−
1
2k
)L
With this we get:
Pr [A1] =
l
L
(
1−
1
2k
)L−1
+
(
1−
l
L
)(
1−
1
2k
)L
Let us calculate the probability Pr [AL|A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1]. This is equal
to:
Pr [AL|A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1] =
Pr [AL|BL ∧A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1] Pr [BL|A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1] +
Pr
[
AL|BL ∧ A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧AL−1
]
Pr
[
BL|A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1
]
It is straight forward to see that:
Pr [BL|A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧AL−1] = lL and Pr
[
BL|A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1
]
= 1 − l
L
.
We also have:
Pr [AL|BL ∧A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1] = 1
and
Pr
[
AL|BL ∧ A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1
]
= 1−
1
2k
We get the final result:
Pr [AL|A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AL−1] =
l
L
+
(
1−
1
2k
)(
1−
l
L
)
= 1−
1
2k
(
1−
l
L
)
Note that all other conditional probabilities for the events A2, A3, . . . , AL−1 must
lie between these two calculated probabilities. This gives us the upper and lower
bounds for the probability of guessing the correct permutation as:((
1−
1
2k
)L−1(
l
L
)
+
(
1−
1
2k
)L (
1−
l
L
))L
≤ Pr [σ is correct] ≤
(
1−
1
2k
(
1−
l
L
))L
7 Obtaining the Secret Question
Let S = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the universal set of all features. Let A1 and A2
denote two subsets of this set. In actual, A1 and A2, denote the set of features of
two pictures drawn randomly according to an arbitrary distribution. We assume
that any feature i in S is equally likely to occur in any of the subsets drawn. We
define the following two indicator variables:
Ii =
{
1 if i ∈ A1
0 otherwise
Ji =
{
1 if i ∈ A2
0 otherwise
Then we have that, |A1 ∩ A2| =
n∑
i=1
IiJi. The number of subsets of S containing
a given feature i would be 2n−1. Since each subset of S is equally likely to contain
i regardless of the distribution with which the subset is drawn out, we have:
Pr [A1 contains i] = Pr [A2 contains i] = 2
n−1/2n = 1/2
From this and the fact that the two subsets are drawn independently of each
other, we have:
E [|A1 ∩ A2|] =
n∑
i=1
E [IiJi] =
n∑
i=1
E [Ii]E [Ji]
Now,E [Ii] =
∑
A1⊆S
Ii Pr [A1 is chosen fromS] = 2
n−1/2n = 1/2. Similarly,E [Ji] =
1/2. Finally, this gives us:
E [|A1 ∩ A2|] =
n∑
i=1
E [Ii]E [Ji] = n/4
In general we can see that:
E [|A1 ∩ A2 ∩ . . . ∩ At|] =
n
2t+1
=
1
2
E [|A1 ∩ A2 ∩ . . . ∩ At−1|]
We analyze the three protocols using the result obtained above. According to
over discussion in Section III, the adversary will try to narrow down the number
of possible secret features by using the algorithm GetBasicQ described in Section
III.
7.1 The Basic Protocol
The adversary H looks at the current picture and its answer given by the user.
It performs the procedure called GetBasicQ in described in Algorithm 1. Notice
that “Compute Ak” means extracting the features of picture Ak.
Algorithm 1 GetBasicQ
Input: A set of pictures A1, A2, . . . together with their answers a1, a2, . . .
Output: The secret feature q
1: if the answer bit position is 0 then
2: Wait for the next iteration.
3: else
4: Extract the features in the picture as A1
5: repeat
6: For each picture k:
7: if ak = 1 (The answer bit at position j then
8: Compute Ak (The picture at position i) and assign A1 ← A1 ∩ Ak.
9: else
10: As ak = 0 (The answer bit at position j), so compute Ak (The
picture at position i) and assign A1 ← A1 −Ak.
11: end if
12: until |A1| = 1 and halt.
13: end if
Next we compute the expected number of steps the adversary has to wait
until he gets the above algorithm to halt.
Theorem 1 If A successfully extracts all the features, then the expected number
of steps is log2 n
Proof. Let A
(k)
1 be the set A1 after the kth step. Our inductive proof is as follows:
First assume that k = 2. There are two cases: First if ak = 1 then as computed
above:
E
[
A
(2)
1
]
= E
[∣∣∣A(1)1 ∩ A2∣∣∣] = n/22
And, if ak = 0, we also get the result:
E
[
A
(2)
1
]
= E
[∣∣∣A(1)1 −A2∣∣∣] = E [∣∣∣A(1)1 ∩ Ac2∣∣∣] = n/22
This is true, since Ac2, the complement of A2, is also a subset of S.
Now, in general for k = t, we have:
E
[
A
(t)
1
]
= n
/
2t
So, if at = 1, then:
E
[
A
(t+1)
1
]
= E
[∣∣∣A(t)1 ∩ At+1∣∣∣] = 12E
[
A
(t)
1
]
=
n
2t+1
And, if at = 0, then again:
E
[
A
(t+1)
1
]
= E
[∣∣∣A(t)1 −At+1∣∣∣] = E [∣∣∣A(t)1 ∩ Act+1∣∣∣] = 12E
[
A
(t)
1
]
=
n
2t+1
The adversary will stop for some k if E
[
A
(k)
1
]
= 1, this means that:
n
/
2k = 1⇒ k = log2 n
Now, the number of iterations (pictures) for the adversary to observe are
log2 n. At each step the adversary has to extract the features of a picture, hence
the expected amount of work at each step is n/2 and hence the total amount of
work to be done by the adversary in the basic protocol is: n2 log2 n. How about the
probability of success of the algorithm?We have assumed in this analysis that the
adversary can extract all features in the image. In general, an adversary might
not be able to extract everything in an image, including the secret feature. We
can associate an average probability of p with the extraction secret feature, which
shows that the secret will be extracted at an average probability of p whenever
the adversary is presented with a picture with answer ’1’. The ’1’ instances occur
with an equal probability of 1/2. Therefore, the average probability of success
of the above algorithm is: p
log2 n
2 . In the special case, where the probability of
the secret picture being extracted out is 1/2, the average probability would be:(
1
2
) log2 n
2 = 1√
n
.
7.2 The Enhanced Protocol
Now suppose the adversary H wants to find out the hidden question in the
enhanced protocol. This time the adversary cannot use the simple procedure
GetBasicQ it used for the basic protocol because of the use of the permutation σ.
It has to be selective in its choices. This time the adversary has to use a slightly
modified version of GetBasicQ called GetEnhancedQ described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 GetEnhancedQ
Input: A ≥ L set of pictures A1, A2, . . . together with an equal number of bits
a1, a2, . . .
Output: The secret feature q
1: Select a random picture position i between 1 and L.
2: Select a random answer position j between 1 and L.
3: if the answer bit position is 0 then
4: Wait for the next iteration.
5: else
6: Extract the features in the picture as A1
7: repeat
8: For each iteration k:
9: if ak = 1 then
10: Compute Ak and assign A1 ← A1 ∩Ak.
11: else
12: As ak = 0, so compute Ak and assign A1 ← A1 − Ak.
13: end if
14: until |A1| = 1 and halt.
15: end if
Now assume that the adversary does the following: Whenever it has guessed
an incorrect path, it executes the above algorithm for an expected number of
log2 n steps and then goes back again to choose a different path (This shows
the expected time until the adversary realizes that it has chosen the wrong
picture and answer pair). For each picture position 1 ≤ i ≤ L, there are a
possible L answer positions. Each of these are equally likely for the adversary
to pick. Out of these, only l result in halting the algorithm. If the adversary,
found the correct path, it will stop by outputting the feature. This can occur
with probability l
/
L2. If the adversary chooses the wrong path, it will go back
again and choose another path. The total number of correct paths in the second
iteration would be: l
(
L2 − 1
)
. Thus the probability of the adversary stopping
after two iterations would be: l
L2
(
L2−l
L2−1
)
. Continuing in this fashion, if we let
Pr [yi] denote the probability of the adversary stopping at the ith step, we get:
Pr [yi] =
l
L2
(
L2 − l
L2 − 1
)
· · ·
(
L2 − l − (i− 2)
L2 − (i− 1)
)
, for i ≥ 2
Each of these paths results in the termination of the algorithm after a cer-
tain number of steps by finally choosing the correct path. We can now find the
expected number of steps of the adversary:
Let Y denote the number of steps taken by the adversary. Thus yi ∈ Y
denotes the number of steps in the ith path. We get:
E [Y ] =
l
L2
log2 n+
l
L2
(
L2 − l
L2 − 1
)
(2 log2 n) + · · ·+
l
L2
(
L2 − l
L2 − 1
)(
L2 − l − 1
L2 − 2
)
· · ·
(
L2 − l −
(
L2 − l − 1
)
L2 − (L2 − l)
)(
L2 − l + 1
)
log2 n
=
l
L2
log2 n(1 + 2
(
L2 − l
L2 − 1
)
+ · · ·+
(
L2 − l + 1
)(L2 − l
L2 − 1
)(
L2 − l− 1
L2 − 2
)
· · ·
(
L2 − l −
(
L2 − l − 1
)
L2 − (L2 − l)
)
)
=
l
L2
log2 n
(
L2 − l
)
!
(L2 − 1)!
∑L2−l+1
i=1
(
i
(
L2 − i
)
!
(L2 − l − i+ 1)!
)
=
l
L2
log2 n
(
L2 − l
)
!
(L2 − 1)!
L2
(
L2 + 1
) (
L2 − 1
)
!
l (l + 1) (L2 − l)!
=
L2 + 1
l + 1
log2 n
In light of the previous reult, the total amount of work done by the adversary is
L2+1
l+1
n
2 log2 n. The probability of success of the algorithm depends on the whether
the adversary has chosen the correct combination of picture and answer position
pair. Thus if we again let p be the average proabibility of successfully extracting
the feature, the result come out to be the same as before: p
log2 n
2 .
7.3 The Practical Scheme
We could analyze the workload in the practical scheme by viewing the behavior
of the linear congruential generator for small values of the arguments. However,
for simplicity, we can assume that the position of the next picture is determined
analogous to the previous protocol. Thus we can let L = L and l = 1 in our
result for the previous protocol. What about the value of n? Ofcourse this should
depend on the dictionary size N which can be anywhere in the range of 103 to
105. However, n represents the number of distinct features and this could not be
possibly more than N . We say this because two words might contain the same
letters like “wolf” and “flow”, and two words might represent the same concept,
like synonyms. Therefore we can assume n = xN where 0 < x < 1. Assuming
x = 0.5 we get the following result for adversary’s work: p
2+1
2
N
4 log2
(
N
2
)
. The
probability of success in this case would also come out to be p
log2 n
2 .
7.4 Comparative Workloads of the Three Protocols
Based on the results obtained in the previous subsections, we can show the
comparative workloads on the adversary in the three protocols. First we show
the workload by fixing n = 105 and N = 104 and plotting the three graphs as
a function of L. In the enhanced scheme we have assumed l =
⌈
L
2
⌉
. The three
plots are shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Comparative workloads of the adversary in the three schemes
The workload of the adversary increases in the two schemes with the increas-
ing value of L as compared to the basic protocol. Notice the use of “Practical
Zone Delimiter”. This is placed at a value of L = 25, since we believe that putting
more pictures in a given iteration would indeed place computational burden on
the human user. For small values of L, we see that the Basic and the Enhanced
schemes work better as compared to the Practical Scheme. As we increase L
even beyond the practical zone, the practical scheme becomes better. But this is
because we have fixed l to be one half L in the enhanced scheme. The advantage
of the two schemes over the basic scheme does not come without a disadvantage.
The memory and processing requirements of the other two schemes also increase
with an increment in L. The following table shows the comparison:
Figure 7, shows the comparative workloads as a function of n (N in the
practical scheme case). The value of L is fixed at 20. The range of n is from
103 to 105 and that of N is from 102 to 104. Interestingly, the enhanced scheme
becomes better with larger values of n as should be evident from the fact that
N has a much smaller value as compared to n.
Fig. 7. Comparative workloads of the adversary in the three schemes with changing n
Table 2. Qualitative comparison of the three schemes
Scheme Image Evaluation Memory Computation
Basic ✔ q ✘
Enhanced ✔ q and σ (L, l) ✘
Practical ✔ q and a, b, xi all < L 1 multiplication and
addition modulo L
Finally we show the interrelationship between l and L in the enhanced
shceme. We see that the workload of the scheme increases significantly with
lower values of l and higher values of L. This is shown in Figure 8.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Human identification protocols can be a good alternative for the traditionally
less secure password based systems. Over the years researchers have tried to con-
struct efficient Human identification protocols which are secure against passive
or active adversaries. However, the protocols run short in terms of efficiency and
security. One such protocol was proposed by us in [1] and its security was based
on the “conjectured difficulty” of obtaining the secret after observing some au-
thentication sessions. In this paper, we have extended the work by giving some
candidate alternative protocols, finding the exact harndess of these protocols in
terms of the effort required by the human adversary as well as giving a detailed
analysis of the protocol proposed in [1]. A brief survey regarding the number of
Fig. 8. Graph of the adversary’s workload in the enhanced scheme with changing l and
fixed L
possible features in an image was also carried out. Our results show that a prac-
tical implementation of the protocol might be feasile provided we are against a
resource constrained human adversary.
A notable future line of work is to device a similar protocol secure against
active adversaries. This might involve sending challenges to the server by the
human user similar to [19]. However, it remains an open problem whether we
can fine tune the protocols so as to make them secure against active adversaries
without increasing the workload on legitimate users. Another direction of future
work is to come up with a different model for the distribution of features in
images found on the web. This might give a close to realistic quantification of
the workload on the adversary.
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